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CAN PERSONAL SERVITUDES BE WORDED IN SUCH A WAY 
THAT THEY ARE PERPETUAL IN NATURE AND THUS FREELY 
TRANSFERABLE AND TRANSMISSIBLE?
Resnekov v Cohen 2012 1 SA 314 (WCC)
1  Introduction
The issues in Resnekov v Cohen (2012 1 SA 314 (WCC)) were whether a restrictive 
condition inserted into the title deeds of the servient property constituted a praedial 
or personal servitude, and if found to be personal, whether it could be made 
transferable to successors in title by the correct wording of the restrictive condition 
in title deeds of the servient property.
2  Facts of the case
The applicant and the respondent owned neighbouring properties in Duncan Road, 
Sea Point. The applicant applied for an urgent interdict aimed at preventing the 
respondent from erecting a further storey above the level of the existing ceiling 
of his residence on the basis that doing so would be in conflict with a title deed 
restriction applicable to his property. The two properties originally formed part of 
a parcel of land which was purchased by Kantorowitch in July 1923. Kantorowitch 
sold much of this parcel to two different purchasers in August 1923 and in July 
1924, while retaining only a small part of the original property, which at present 
belongs to the respondent. In 1926 Kantorowitch sold off this last piece of land to the 
respondent’s predecessor in title. The deed of transfer, executed on 10 April 1926, 
contained the following restrictive condition: “No building other than single storied 
buildings shall be allowed to be erected on the property hereby transferred.” This 
restriction was duly inserted into the title deeds of the respondent’s property in favour 
of “Kantorowitch and his successors in title”. On transfer of the property in 1926, 
Kantorowitch no longer owned any property surrounding or adjoining the property 
sold to the respondent’s predecessor. However, in March 1928, Kantorowitch bought 
back a piece of the property he had earlier sold off and which had in the meantime 
been subdivided. Part of this piece of land became the property of the applicant in 
2010. The respondent had submitted plans to the local authority, manifesting an 
intention of effecting certain alterations to his property, which would have the effect 
of adding a further storey to his existing residence. The present application was 
aimed at preventing this result, relying exclusively on the wording of the restrictive 
condition referred to above (par 1 to 5).
3  Decision of the court
On the enquiry whether the restrictive condition against the respondent’s title 
deed constituted a praedial or a personal servitude, Griesel J accepted as trite 
that a praedial servitude is established over a servient tenement for the benefit of 
a dominant tenement in perpetuity, irrespective of the identity of the owner; by 
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contrast, a personal servitude is constituted over a servient tenement in favour of a 
particular person and is ordinarily extinguished by the death of the holder (par 6).
Griesel J agreed with counsel for the applicant that whether a praedial or personal 
servitude was created depended on the intention of the parties. However, he pointed 
out that the contract between the parties was not before the court and that the court 
had to rely on the original deed of transfer, executed on 10 April 1926. He mentioned 
that on its original wording the restrictive condition was apparently intended to 
benefit “the owner or owners of the adjoining property”, which on being considered 
too vague by the registrar, was supplemented with the words “being the remainder 
of the land known as Lots 11, 12 and 13”. Griesel J conceded that on this wording 
the restrictive condition would have constituted a praedial servitude in favour of 
an adjoining dominant landowner. However, this wording was later deleted and 
replaced by the wording “in favour of Kantorowitch and his successors in title”. 
Griesel J did not agree with the submission of counsel for the applicant that this 
wording likewise demonstrated that a praedial servitude was intended and that the 
reference to “Kantorowitch and his successors in title”, rather than to “the owners 
of the adjoining property”, does not suggest that a personal servitude was intended 
(par 7).
Griesel J pointed out that for a praedial servitude to exist there had to be a 
dominant and a servient property. It was therefore fatal to the applicant’s contention 
that the condition concerned did not purport to be registered in favour of any 
particular property, since on the authority of Malan v Ardconnel Investments (Pty) 
Ltd (1988 2 SA 12 (A) 37D) the existence or non-existence of a dominant tenement 
is the decisive factor in differentiating between personal and praedial servitudes. 
He further regarded it as significant that the servitude was not registered against the 
title deeds of the dominant property, which is usual with praedial servitudes. In this 
regard it should be noted, however, that despite conveyancing practice of endorsing 
the title deeds of the dominant property, registration against the title deeds of the 
servient property is the only requirement for the valid establishment of both praedial 
and personal servitudes. This is made clear in the following statement of Joubert JA 
in the Malan case:
“The normal procedure for the registration of servitudes in a transfer of land in the Deeds Office is 
to embody the terms of the servitude with a description of the servitude holder (personal servitude) 
or the dominant tenement (praedial servitude) in the title deed of the servient tenement. As a matter 
of conveyancing and for convenience the existence of the registered praedial servitude is endorsed 
upon the title deed of the dominant tenement …. It is the registration of the servitude in the title deed 
of the servient tenement that constitutes the servitude in law” (37E-G).
It is only in the case where restrictive conditions in townships are construed as 
praedial urban servitudes that they are registered against the title deeds of both the 
servient and dominant land due to the fact that each erf in the township became 
simultaneously a dominant and a servient tenement.
Griesel J finally pointed out that the fact that the provisions made specific mention 
of a particular person – instead of mentioning a dominant property – was a powerful 
indication that a personal servitude was being created. In concluding that the 
condition in question constituted a personal servitude and not a praedial servitude, 
Griesel J found further support in the presumption in law that, in cases where it is 
uncertain whether a particular servitude is praedial or personal, the servitude is 
presumed to be personal. He cited “Servitudes” 24 LAWSA (2 ed) paragraph 543 in 
support of this presumption (par 8-9).
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Griesel J then considered the alternative argument on behalf of the applicant, 
namely that even if the restriction is regarded as personal, the wording “and his 
successors in title” rendered it perpetual and that although ordinarily personal 
servitudes terminate upon the death of the beneficiary, this legal rule applied only 
in the absence of an agreement to the contrary. Counsel for the applicant cited the 
following passage in Hall and Kellaway Servitudes (3 ed) 163-164 in support:
“Despite the dictum of Innes J [in Willoughby’s case] it is submitted that in constituting a personal 
servitude the parties to it are at liberty to make it assignable at the option of the grantee, and even 
to make the right a perpetual one provided it is of such a nature that it can exist in perpetuity or at 
least for an indeterminable period. …
 The idea that personal servitudes are inalienable and that they die with the holder appears to be an 
inheritance from Roman law …, but the development of mining and mineral rights during modern 
times has made this doctrine untenable, and the alienability of personal servitudes has become 
entirely a matter of the intention of the contracting parties.”
These passages were quoted in Bhamjee v Mergold Beleggings (Edms) Bpk (1983 
4 SA 555 (T) 562A-C) where, for the purposes of argument it was accepted that a 
personal servitude could be worded so as to endure for an indeterminate period in 
favour of the first beneficiary and his or her successors. However, on the wording 
of the particular servitude at issue in that case, it was held that no such intention 
could be found. The applicant also relied on Meintjes v Oberholzer and Graafreinet 
Municipality ((1859) 3 Searle 265), where a full court upheld a servitude imposed 
by the crown over the defendant’s farm, allowing members of the public to use fuel 
or firewood growing on the farm. The applicant construed this as recognition by the 
court of the existence of perpetual personal servitudes. However, Griesel J accepted 
the explanation on behalf of the respondent that the court merely gave a decision as 
to the meaning of the words “het brand-hout op dit land tot algemeen gebruik” in 
the original crown grant of a farm to the first owner. He reasoned that although the 
public’s right in terms of the grant is described as a servitude by Van der Merwe 
Sakereg (2 ed) 496 and 545, there was no mention that a perpetual personal servitude 
could be created by agreement (par 10-13).
The applicant then relied on the proviso contained in section 65(1) of the Deeds 
Registries Act 47 of 1937, which states that:
“in the case of a servitude in favour of the public or of all or some of the owners or occupiers of erven 
or lots in a township or settlement, the registrar may, if in his opinion it is impracticable to require 
such deed to be executed by the persons in whose favour the servitude is created, register such deed 
notwithstanding the fact that it has not been executed by such persons.”
In view of its strict wording, the inference drawn from the proviso, namely that 
perpetual personal servitudes are permissible, is misplaced. All that the proviso 
provides is that two kinds of servitudes, namely servitudes in favour of the public and 
servitudes in favour of all or some of the owners or occupiers of erven in a township, 
may if impracticable be executed without the co-operation of all the beneficiaries. 
Griesel J added that the applicant’s reliance on section 65(1) could be countered by 
the provisions of section 66 of the act, which gives full effect to our common law 
by providing that “no personal servitude of usufruct, usus or habitatio, purporting 
to extend beyond the lifetime of the person in whose favour it is created, shall be 
registered”. This is fortified by the second part of section 66, which reads “nor may 
a transfer or cession of such personal servitude to any person other than the owner 
of the land encumbered thereby, be registered”. Note, however, that section 66 refers 
only to the personal servitudes of usufruct, usus and habitatio and does not cover 
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the so-called irregular personal servitudes which might be the servitudes we are 
dealing with here (par 13).
The final arrow in the applicant’s quiver was based on the passage in the decision 
of the appellate division in Durban City Council v Woodhaven Ltd (1987 3 SA 555 
(A) 562D-E), where the court declined to decide “whether a personal servitude could 
be rendered alienable by agreement between the parties”. Accordingly, applicant’s 
counsel invited the court to “fill the gap” and to find that a personal servitude can 
indeed be rendered alienable by agreement between the parties (par 14).
In summing up, Griesel J pointed out that the counsel for applicant frankly 
conceded that there was no direct authority in our law for his proposition, namely 
that the parties may by agreement convert a personal servitude, which is ordinarily 
limited to the lifetime of the beneficiary, into a perpetual right. The opinion of 
Hall and Kellaway had not been followed by the courts and their reliance on the 
analogy of mineral rights was unsustainable due to the fact that mineral rights are 
both transferable and inheritable. Furthermore, there is ample authority in our case 
law and jurisprudence for the general principle in broad, unqualified terms that 
the right by virtue of a personal servitude cleaves inseparably to the beneficiary, 
that it is not transferable or transmissible by will and that it perishes with the death 
of the beneficiary. Case law and jurisprudence quoted in support of this view 
include Willoughby’s Consolidated Co Ltd v Copthall Stores Ltd (1913 AD 267 
282), Erlax Properties (Pty) Ltd v Registrar of Deeds (1992 1 SA 879 (A) 886G-I) 
and “Servitudes” 24 LAWSA (2 ed) par 541 and 579. Finally, Griesel J pointed out 
that the applicant’s contention was also in conflict with the well-established rule of 
construction enunciated inter alia in Kruger v Joles Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd (2009 3 
SA 5 (SCA) par 8) and “Servitudes” 24 LAWSA (2 ed) paragraph 543 that, because a 
servitude is a limitation on ownership, it must be accorded an interpretation which 
least encumbers the servient tenement (par 15-17).
In view of the above considerations and sitting as a judge of first instance, Griesel 
J declined the applicant’s invitation to make new law. Consequently he held that 
the application was dismissed due to the fact that the applicant did not have the 
necessary locus standi to enforce the restrictive condition in question (par 18).
4  Discussion
There is ample authority that the question whether parties intended to constitute 
a praedial or personal servitude depends on the agreement of servitude and the 
surrounding circumstances (par 7). The difficulty in this case was that the court was 
presented only with the notarial deed of transfer of the servient land which reserved 
a negative servitude of not raising any buildings on the servient land in favour 
of “Kantorowitch and his successors in title”. On close inspection, the restrictive 
condition that we are dealing with here, namely a prohibition on the owner of a 
servient tenement to raise any buildings on the land higher than a single storey, is a 
typical example of a negative urban servitude in favour of an adjoining landowner. 
Although there was evidence that the registrar suggested that the wording in the 
notarial deed should be changed to make the servitude “in favour of the owners 
of the remainder of the land known as Lots 11, 12 and 13”, which would have 
resulted in the constitution of a valid negative urban servitude in favour of the plots 
of land mentioned, this phrase was replaced in the registered notarial deed by the 
words “Kantorowitch and his successors in title”. This made it virtually impossible 
for Griesel J to decide that the servitude was praedial in nature and enduring in 
favour of the lots mentioned, which presumably included the lot of the respondent. 
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The servitude concerned was in the nature of a personal servitude for lack of a 
specifically mentioned dominant tenement.
Thus counsel for the applicant was forced to try to fit the servitude concerned into 
another category of servitudes in order to make it perpetual in nature. His efforts 
to bring the servitude into the mould of a so-called public servitude in favour of the 
general public was not successful, for the wording of the particular servitude did not 
fit this particular mould. A servitude which intends to benefit “Kantorowitch and 
his successors in title”, although intended to be a servitude in favour of more than 
one person, is not a servitude established for the public in general or even a specific 
sector of the general public. Furthermore, a restrictive condition prohibiting the 
owner of a particular erf to raise the buildings on his land to more than one storey 
does not fit into the normal content of so-called public servitudes. It differs from the 
usual examples of public servitudes constituted in favour of the public in general 
such as a right of outspan, the right to gather wood (see the Meintjes case referred to 
by Griesel J at par 12), the right to cross land to reach the beach or across a particular 
landed tenement in favour of the public in general. This type of servitude may by 
agreement between the parties be registered against the title deeds of private land 
as acknowledged by Griesel J and permitted in terms of section 65(1) of the Deeds 
Registries Act 47 of 1937. Bamford v Minister of Community Development and 
State Auxiliary Services (1981 3 SA 1054 (C)) is authority that such servitudes may 
be created in a will and Forellendam Bpk v Jacobsbaai Coastal Farms (Pty) Ltd 
(1993 4 SA 138 (C)) supports that view that public servitudes can be established on 
proof that the public has used a certain route over a particular landed property from 
time immemorial. However, the most important mode of establishment of so-called 
public servitudes is when land is granted by the state to a private person subject to 
the reservation of, for example, a right of way in favour of the public in general. For 
this reason such rights should not be classified as private real rights, but rather as 
entitlements granted by a public authority and registered on the title deeds of the 
servient land in favour of the public in general. For these reasons this particular 
servitude contained in the deed of transfer cannot gain perpetual effect by being 
classified as a so-called public servitude.
Due to the fact that modern South African law does not limit the kind of personal 
servitudes to the traditional servitudes of usufruct, the right of use and the right of 
habitation, the restrictive condition concerned could possibly have been construed 
as a so-called irregular servitude (servitus irregulare). These servitudes are usually 
praedial in nature but become personal servitudes when constituted in favour of 
a particular person in his/her personal capacity and not in his/her capacity as the 
owner of land. An example is where a right of way over a farm is granted to a person 
in his personal capacity, for example, to facilitate access to a beach cottage during 
holiday seasons. Further examples are the granting of trading rights over a farm to 
a particular person and the granting of a right to lay a railway line, underground 
cables or underground sewerage pipes on or under a particular landed property in 
favour of a particular local authority (see “Servitudes” 24 LAWSA (2 ed) par 580 
and authorities quoted there). The lack of benefit to a person who has been granted a 
negative servitude preventing the owner of the servient land to raise buildings on his 
land, militates against the construction of this particular servitude as an irregular 
personal servitude. Moreover, although the granting of some of these servitudes 
in favour of municipalities may render such servitudes virtually perpetual, due 
to the fact that the “life-time” of a personal servitude is limited to 100 years (see 
“Servitudes” 24 LAWSA (2 ed) par 599 and authorities quoted there), this would not 
       
PERSONAL SERVITUDES – FREELY TRANSFERABLE AND TRANSMISSIBLE? 345
[ISSN 0257 – 7747] TSAR 2013 . 2
apply to the servitude concerned, which is granted in favour of “Kantorowitch and 
his successors in title”.
Closely related to the so-called irregular servitudes are the restrictive conditions 
in favour of certain lot-holders of a township or the developer of the township. If 
constituted in favour of and against all the lots in the township, they are construed 
as reciprocal urban praedial servitudes in favour of and against all the plots of 
land in the township. In the event, on the other hand, that they are constituted 
in favour of the owner or developer of the township they become personal 
servitudes constituted in favour of a particular person in his capacity as owner 
of the township. If construed as personal servitudes they bind only the person 
against whom and benefit only the person in whose favour they are registered. 
Presently, the construction of restrictive conditions in the title deeds of lot-holders 
in townships as personal servitudes seems to have been only a step in forcing 
the foreign English concept of “an equitable interest in land” into the truly South 
African mould of urban praedial servitudes to make these conditions enforceable. 
The present case is not concerned with restrictive conditions registered against 
all landowners in a township, and even if it could be construed as a personal 
servitude, it would not be perpetual in nature.
With regard to Hall and Kellaway’s reliance on mineral rights as a species of 
personal servitudes which are perpetual in the sense of being transferable and 
transmissible, it must be pointed out that the recognition of mineral rights as a 
separate real right in land alongside ownership in violation of the cuius est solum 
rule was spearheaded by the following circumstances: there was, first, the Cape 
practice (following the British practice) of granting state land with the reservation 
of mineral rights in favour of the state; secondly, the overriding importance of 
mining to the South African economy after the discovery of diamonds and gold 
in South Africa in the second half of the nineteenth century; and, finally, the 
fact that large mining companies needed security of title before investing in 
the expensive activities of prospecting for minerals and then mining them. (See 
Van der Merwe Sakereg (1989) 553; Milton “Ownership” in Zimmermann and 
Visser (eds) Southern Cross: Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa (1996) 
681.) Forced by economic realities, independent mineral rights have since 1881 
been recognised in the Zuid-Afrikaanse Republiek of the Transvaal and later in 
the precursors of and the present Deeds Registries Act. (See Resolution of the 
Volksraad of the Zuid-Afrikaanse Republiek of 8 Nov 1881 a 3 of Act 7 of 1883; 
s 30-32 of the Registration of Deeds and Titles Act 25 of 1909 (Transvaal); s 3(j), 
13 and 41 of the Deeds Registries Act 13 of 1918 and s 70 and 71 of the Deeds 
Registries Act 47 of 1937.) Reluctant to accept the English principle that land can 
be divided into horizontal layers, our courts first classified mineral rights as quasi-
servitudes (Coronation Collieries v Malan 1911 TPD 577 591; Rocher v Registrar 
of Deeds 1911 TPD 311 316) and more particularly as quasi-personal servitudes 
(Lazarus and Jackson v Wessels 1903 TS 499 510; Van Vuren v Registrar of Deeds 
1907 TS 289 294-295; Ex parte Marchini 1964 1 SA 147 (T) 150; Aussenkjer 
Diamante (Pty) Ltd v Namex (Pty) Ltd 1980 3 SA 896 (SWA) 902-903). Only 
three South African cases up to now had the courage to take mineral rights out 
of the mould of servitudes and classify them as real rights sui generis (Ex parte 
Pierce 1950 3 SA 628 (O) 634; Erasmus v Afrikander Proprietary Mines Ltd 1976 
1 SA 950 (W) 956E; Apex Mines Ltd v Administrator, Transvaal 1986 4 SA 581 
(T) 590I-591C). This classification allows mineral rights to have a sui generis 
content, namely to be freely assignable and transmissible, not to be subject to the 
constraint of being exercised salva rei substantia, nor terminated when the owner 
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regains ownership of the land subject to mineral rights and creating the possibility 
of mortgaging a mineral right and of constituting a usufruct over mineral rights. 
(See Van der Merwe Sakereg 560-562.) It was therefore unacceptable for Hall 
and Kellaway to rely on the classification of mineral rights to prove that the 
alienability of personal servitudes had become entirely a matter of the intention 
of the contracting parties.
The best line that could perhaps have been taken by the applicant was to develop 
an argument around the Bhamjee case. In that case a certain N, the registered 
owner of a farm, had sold the property to the Coronation Collieries Ltd with the 
reservation of trading rights over the property for himself subject to a certain 
notarial lease. In the appeal to the full bench of the Transvaal provincial division, 
the sole issue was whether the rights created by the reservation in the title deeds 
of the servient land were indeed rights that were perpetual and that could thus 
devolve upon the heirs and successors in title of N, the holder of the servitude. The 
appellants contended that a personal servitude had been established in favour of 
N and that such servitude had not been destined to endure beyond the life of N but 
had terminated on his death. In reply it was argued that a perpetual servitude could 
be created in perpetuity or for an indefinite period and the court was asked to have 
regard to the circumstances of the case. The following surrounding circumstances 
were relied upon to indicate that it was not the intention of the parties that the 
servitude was destined to last only until the death of the holder of the servitude: at 
the time that the servitude was established, the holder of the servitude was already 
70 years old; the notarial lease mentioned in the reservation was not intended to 
endure only until the death of the servitude holder and the servitude was registered 
against the title deeds of the servient tenement. The court decided that even if it 
could be accepted for argument’s sake that a personal servitude could extend in 
favour of successors in title (a point not decided by the court), there was nothing 
in the clause referring to the servitude which indicated such an intention: the 
reservation of the trading rights had been only in favour of N and not also, for 
example, in favour of his successors in title (562D); the reference to the notarial 
lease had merely served as notice to the purchaser and any successors in title of 
the existence of the lease and, far from rendering the entitlements in terms of a 
personal servitude freely assignable and destined to endure indefinitely, it instead 
indicated an intention of the parties to restrict the powers of the servitude holder. 
In the event that the holder of the servitude was granted the power to transfer his 
right freely, the reference to the existing notarial lease was superfluous (562E-F). 
Divesting a personal servitude of its traditional characteristic of inalienability and 
its restriction to, at most, the life of the holder would require clear wording to that 
effect. Such an extraordinary consequence for a personal servitude which would 
burden the entitlements of the owner of the servient land significantly cannot 
be presumed easily and must appear clearly from the words used in the clause 
reserving the servitude (562G-H).
Although the court found that in view of the clear wording in the reservation of 
the trading rights referring solely to the holder of the servitude it was impermissible 
to consider the surrounding circumstances, the court nevertheless pointed out that 
these did not necessarily support an intention to establish a freely transferable 
perpetual right on the part of the holder of the servitude. The fact that the holder 
was already 70 years old could, instead of endowing the holder with a perpetual 
right, have persuaded Coronation Collieries to grant the servitude in view of its 
expected shorter endurance (563A); the notarial lease mentioned in the reservation 
terminated at least with the death of the last lessee and the reference to such lease 
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was insufficient to support an intention that the lease would survive the death of 
the servitude holder (563C-D); and the registration of the reservation indicated an 
intention that the right should become real and had no bearing on an intention to 
specify the duration thereof (563E).
In my view this judgment has, as submitted by counsel for the applicant, at 
least opened the door for certain kinds of personal servitudes attaining a more 
perpetual character if specifically described as such in the notarial deed reserving 
such servitude. Thus, for instance, with the correct description, the reservation of 
trading rights as in the Bhamjee case could possibly in future be endowed with 
perpetuity by the correct designation in the constituting documents. An argument 
in favour of such a construction would be that our courts, except for Vivier JA 
in the Durban City Council case (561E-F), have up to now never authoritatively 
stated that the characteristic of inalienability and intransmissibility of personal 
servitudes also apply to so-called irregular personal servitudes. Some of these 
personal servitudes (like a right of way in favour of a person over a servient plot 
of land) are not granted for the sustenance of the beneficiary as in the case of 
the traditional servitudes of usufruct, right of use and right of habitation. This 
could then be an area where our courts could be encouraged to develop the law, 
as should have happened by founding a perpetual right of passage to a burial 
ground in favour of family members on religious and cultural beliefs that deceased 
members of their family must be buried close to their homestead and thus easily 
accessible to fortify their links with the spirits of their ancestors – as presumably 
insinuated by Cachalia AJA in Dlamini v Joosten (2006 3 SA 342 (SCA) par 21). 
Instead, the court linked the burial right and the burial ground not to particular 
families but to people residing on the land. The court accordingly found that the 
burial right was in the nature of a personal servitude which the occupier had over 
the property on which he possessed a real right of residence at the death of the 
family member who at the time of death was residing on the land, based on the 
Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 ((par 16); see 2006 Annual Survey 
395-396). A similar issue had to be resolved in the case of development rights 
reserved in favour of sectional title developers. An amendment of section 25(4) of 
the Sectional Titles Act was ultimately needed to make such a development right 
transferable and mortgageable after it had been classified as a personal servitude 
in the Erlax case.
5  Conclusion
The restrictive condition concerned restricting buildings on the servient land being 
raised to more than one storey. This was in the nature of an urban praedial servitude 
or even a restrictive condition applying to a number of subdivided erven in a certain 
part of a township. However, the fact that it was constituted in favour of a particular 
person and his successors in title, and not in favour of a dominant tenement, precluded 
it from being classified as a praedial servitude perpetual in nature. The condition 
was correctly classified by Griesel J as a personal servitude. There may be instances 
in which our courts could be persuaded to create new law to endow certain personal 
servitudes with transferability and transmissibility. However, only certain personal 
servitudes should be earmarked for such treatment, and this should happen only 
where, as in the case of mineral rights, there is a clear commercial or other need for 
such recognition. All in all, it should be kept in mind that the recognition of personal 
servitudes of a perpetual nature would burden landed properties to such an extent 
that commerce in such properties would be stilted. In the event that, as in the case 
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of mineral rights, the need for recognising new perpetual rights becomes patent, 
the courts should consider whether it would not be a better option to recognise new 
limited real rights, if necessary, as being of a sui generis character instead of forcing 
them into the mould of personal servitudes.
CG VAN DER MERWE
University of Stellenbosch
      
    
          
         
  
              
             
             
               
                
              
              
                
             
                
          
          
               
       
 
            
             
            
              
            
             
                
              
               
            
              
             
              
            
       
